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EXPERT SOFrWARE SYSTEMS: THE
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

For those of us fascinated with HAL, the 2001: A Space Odyssey
computer', the viability of such a machine is on the near horizon. Conceptually, a computer such as HAL can solve problems intelligently like
a human expert and HAL also reasons using its deductive process based
on a knowledge base 2 that continuously expands by its own conclusions
and by additional input from outside sources.

A.

EXPERT SYSTEM DEFINED

The computer jargon often used to describe such a machine is an
expert system. 3 Expert systems are computer programs that have been
constructed with the assistance of human experts which are capable of
functioning at the standard of, or sometimes at a higher level than, experts in given fields. An expert system works by applying deductive
principles to data contained in its knowledge base. The expert system
it to perform
embodies a depth and richness of knowledge that permit
4
at a level equivalent to, or exceeding that of, an expert.
Expert systems are usually structured so that: (1) the user can request explanations of the lines of reasoning that lead to the expert system's conclusions, (transparency); (2) they reason with the informal,
judgmental, experimental and potential knowledge that underlies exgreat difpertise in a given field (heuristic); and (3) they allow, without
5
ficulty, modification to their knowledge bases (flexibility).
1. HAL refers to a spaceship computer in the movie 2001: A Space Odyssey. HAL
was able to build and add to its knowledge base (see infra note 2) and was capable of taking action independent of human programming and intervention. The name "HAL" was
derived by replacing each letter of IBM with the letter immediately preceding it in the
alphabet.
2. A knowledge base is a compilation of data stored in a medium that the computer
can access at any given time.
3. See GODALL, THE GUIDE TO EXPERT SYSTEMS (1985); FIGENBAUM & MCCORDUCK,
THE FIFTH GENERATION (1983); MICHIE, BUILDING EXPERT SYSTEMS (1983).

4. For a more in depth discussion of what an expert system is, see GODALL, supra

note 3.
5. Susskind, A JurisprudentialApproach to Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 49 MOD. L. REV. 168, 173 (1986).
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CURRENT DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS

Most expert systems are still experimental. Software developers
are increasingly investing in research and development of expert systems. Unfortunately, "[e]xpert systems software development costs are
high, development times seem unusually long, and the resulting programs put a heavy burden on computing resources."' 6 The development
problems are usually attributable to the lack of understanding of the
human brain's reasoning process and to the inability to adapt that understanding to a machine. Because physical and social scientists do not
definitively understand the human creative process, it is conceptually
difficult for a computer programmer to create a representative computer language which emulates human reasoning. Also, along with the
conceptual difficulties, effective expert systems require speed and stor7
age capacities that modern machines cannot yet handle.
C.

CURRENT EXPERT SYSTEM APPLICATIONS

Few expert systems are in day-to-day use. One of the most often
mentioned programs is MYCIN. MYCIN provides assistance to physicians in diagnosing and treating bacterial infections. 8 MYCIN is transparent because it lists the sequence of deduction that led to its
conclusion. MYCIN and other medical diagnostic type expert systems 9
have been very successful.
Inspired by the success of expert systems such as MYCIN, we can
expect development in many areas such as psychology, law, engineering,
architecture, business, aviation, and various others. Nevertheless, the
uses of current expert systems are typically limited to specialized tasks
6. Martins, The Overselling of Expert Systems, DATAMATION, Nov. 1, 1984, at 76.
7. The gains in computer processing speeds over the last five years have been phenomenal. Faster hardware will enable expert systems to handle larger knowledge bases
and arrive at conclusions more quickly. The recent development of optical disk storage
opens a new horizon for mass storage capacity for both mainframe and personal computers. Optical disks may adapt well to the storage requirements of the knowledge base
in certain expert systems. Optical disks, however, are currently "read and write only"
and are not yet ideally suited for expert systems storage requirements.
8. See Susskind, supra note 5, at 174. MYCIN was developed by the physician, Edward H. Shortliffe. The program provides consultive advice on diagnosis and antibiotic
therapy for infectious diseases such as blood infections and meningitis.
9. See Susskind, supra note 5, at 174. Two other well known medical experts systems are CADUCEUS (formerly INTERNIST) and CASNET. CADUCEUS performs diagnosis in the field of internal medicine. CASNET diagnoses, and advocates therapeutic
measures for, the disease process of glaucoma, doing so in a fashion presumably that
opthomologists have acclaimed to be akin to that of an expert in the field. See Shurkin,
Expert Systems: The Practical Face of Artificial Intelligence, TECHNOLOGy REV., Nov.
1983, at 76.
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that place a high value on knowledge of a single, well-defined subject. 10
The current technology favors rule-oriented deductive processes and
tends to shy away from intuitive, common sense reasoning." The key
step in expert system development is trial-and-error consultation between expert and programmer to develop the rules and exceptions that
human experts learn from theory and practice.' 2 This process has become known as "knowledge engineering."
II. APPLYING CURRENT LEGAL PRINCIPLES
TO EXPERT SYSTEMS
A.

INTRODUCTION

Courts have not yet addressed physical and economic injury due to
expert system errors in the tort liability or contractual context. In the
tort liability area, the issue of whether the expert system developer
should be subject to the standard of negligence or strict liability depends on whether the expert system in question is a product or a service. If an expert system is a product, strict liability in tort principles
may apply. If an expert system is a service, negligence principles should
be used. The easy answers are the extremes: a mass produced, mass
marketed expert system would receive strict liability in tort treatment;
whereas, a custom made expert system developed specifically for one
user would most likely be subject to a negligence standard.
An expert system falling between the above extremes provides for
a more difficult analysis in both the tort liability and contractual contexts. Because of the complexity and comparison of human reasoning
to expert systems, in most cases, the courts will have difficulty in classifying expert systems as products or services. The choice will probably
10. Nycum & Fong, Artificial Intelligence & Certain Resulting Legal Issues, 6 U.S.C.
COMPUTER L. INST. § 4, at 4-010 (May 9, 1985) (available at the University of Southern

California Law Library).
11. Expert system developers currently struggle with the concept of programming intuitive and "common sense" reasoning. This is based largely on the fact that physical and
social scientists offer no "rule based" explanation of how the human mind operates in its
intuitive and "common sense" manner.
12. An example of a MYCIN inference rule is:
IF

(1) the infection is primary-bacteremia, and
(2) the site of the culture is a sterile site, and
(3) the suspected portal of entry of the organism is the gastro-intestinal
tract,

THEN

there is suggestive evidence (0.7) that the identity of the organism is
bacteroides.
Nycum & Fong, supra note 10, at 4-008 (quoting Forsyth, The Expert Systems Phenomenon, EXPERT SYSTEMS 1, 6 (R. Forsyth ed. 1984)).
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be based on policy with a close regard to analogous case law involving
products and services similar to expert systems.
The policies which courts should consider, include: (1) the overall
importance of new development of expert systems; (2) the specific societal gain from the use of the expert system in question; (3) the specific
harm to the plaintiff; and (4) the ability of the expert system industry
to self-regulate the competence and skill of those involved in the development of expert systems.

B. EXPERT SYSTEMS: PRODUCTS OR SERVICES?
Current tort and contract analysis require that expert systems must
be divided into two camps: (1) products (typically mass produced and
distributed programs) and (2) services (typically customized programs
with unique characteristics).
Typically, products are manufactured items like autos or soda bottles, 13 produced by companies in the business of the production, marketing, and distribution of such items. 14 Services are functions performed
by professionals such as architects, lawyers, doctors, dentists, consultants and engineers. Providers of services are typically not held to a
strict liability standard. 15 An expert system that is mass produced and
distributed but operates effectively to perform the service normally offered by a human expert clouds the distinction between product and
service. In addition to the element of the human expert comparison,
expert systems requiring human intervention in the program's deductive process renders the classification as either product or service even
more difficult. One resolution may be to look at that which the expert
system provides. If the characteristics of the expert system take the
form of a service for which a human expert may be employed to perform, 16 then that expert system should arguably be designated a service.
13. Exploding soda bottles have been considered eligible for products for strict liability since the earliest product liability cases. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d
453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
14. Ursin, Strict Liability for Defective Business Premises-one step Beyond Rowland
and Greenman, 22 UCLA L. REV. 820 (1975).
15. See Queensbury Union Free School Dist. v. Jim Walter Corp., 91 Misc. 2d 804, 398
N.Y.S. 2d 832 (1977); Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis.2s 444, 256 N.W. 2d 379 (1977).
16. Example: An expert system which instructs the user that, based on the user's investment portfolio, it would be wise to invest in municipal bonds, takes the form of a service since one would employ a human investment expert to render such a service. If this
particular "investment advice expert system" made a mistake in its analysis similar to a
mistake a human expert could conceivably make, the expert system developer should not
be held to a stricter standard of liability than the human investment expert.
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1. Uniform Commercial Code
A fundamental issue in resolving a contract dispute involving a
software transaction is whether Article 2 (hereinafter "Article 2") of
the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter the "U.C.C.") or the common law governs. For purposes of contract law, section 2-105(1) of the
U.C.C. defines "goods as all things ... which are moveable at the time
of identification to contract for sale .... ,,17 The judicial treatment of
software is generally consistent with the judicial treatment of commercial transactions. The conclusion that a contract to develop custom
software is a service contract outside Article 2, while the sale of standardized software is within Article 2, is analogous to the same distinction made by courts between custom and standard goods in general.
In most reported cases involving software contract issues, the status
of the software contract as a sale of goods under the U.C.C. has been
stipulated by the parties or not substantially contested.' 8 In a few cases
involving the sale of software, Article 2 was applied to the transaction.
For example, in RRX Industries,Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc.,' 9 the court held
the California version of the U.C.C. to be applicable to a contract for
the purchase of software - without any discussion of whether the
software was a good.20 The main thrust of the court's analysis, rather,
was its finding that the sale of the software with accompanying services
was within Article 2.
The RRX court relied on the "predominant feature" test to reach
its conclusion. Under this test a contract involving both aspects of sale
and service is classified according to the predominant aspect.21 The
court concluded that because the seller's contractual obligations to install the software, to repair any software errors, and to train the buyer's
employees in the operation of the software were merely incidental services, the transaction fell within Article 2.22
Similarly, in Compu-Med Systems, Inc. v. Cincom Systems, Inc.,23
the court applied Article 2, under Ohio law, to the transaction without
addressing the threshold question of whether software was a good. The
cursory nature of the analyses in RRX Industries and Compu-Med indi17. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1978).
18. See, e.g., National Cash Register Co. v. Adell Indus., Inc., 57 Mich. App. 413, 225

N.W.2d 785 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); W.R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979); see also Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737
(2d Cir. 1979).
19. 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985).
20. Id. at 546.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Unpublished decision, No. 83 Civ. 8729 (S.D.N.Y. Aug 30, 1984)(LExiS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
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cates little judicial hesitancy with the conclusion that software is a good
under Article 2.
The courts similarly treat the sale of software as goods under Article 2 where a single agreement exists between the parties involving the
sale of hardware and software. 24 In Triangle Underwriters,Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.,25 the sale of a computer system consisting of hardware,
standard software, and custom software resulted in breach of contract
when the system failed to function properly because the software did
not operate as promised. The court concluded that the transaction involved the sale of goods under Article 2.26
In another case, Dreier Co., Inc. v. Unitronix Corp.,27 the court
concluded that:
It is clear that the sale of a computer system consists not only of physical goods, but of substantial services essential in producing the final
product. Nevertheless, most authorities agree that the sale of a computer system involving both hardware and software is a "sale of goods"
notwithstanding the incidental service aspects of the sale.
Therefore,
28
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code

...applies.

Although courts have found Article 2 applicable to most sales of
hardware and software under a single agreement, less consistent results
exist when the computer hardware and software are leased rather than
29
sold.
Thus, in most cases, a contract to purchase an expert system will be
subject to Article 2 based on the judiciary's lack of hesitancy to conclude or find otherwise. In the event that an expert system developer
contracts with a user to develop an expert system and the contract's
predominant feature is to provide programming services, then the applicability of Article 2 is less apparent. An expert system developer who
24. See, e.g., Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 F.Supp. 765 (E.D.N.Y.
1978), modified, 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979); Rochester Welding Supply Corp. v. Borroughs
Corp., 78 A.D. 2d 983, 433 N.Y.S. 2d 888 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980); Dreier Co., Inc. v. Unitronix Corp., 218 N.J.Super. 260, 527 A.2d 875 (1986).
25. 457 F.Supp. 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), modified, 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979)(reversed in
part because lower court improperly applied statute of limitations).
26. Id.; but cf, Samuel Black Co. v. Borroughs Corp., 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 954, 962 (D.Mass. 1981)(court unsure whether the computer transaction was covered
by Article 2, but applied it anyway since the outcome was the same under both common
law and the U.C.C.).
27. 218 N.J.Super. 260, 527 A.2d 875 (1986).
28. Id. at 267.
29. See, e.g., Matter of Community Medical Center, 623 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1980)(where
the court concluded that the lease was not the equivalent of a sale since the lessee could
not purchase the computer system in question at the end of the lease term); 0 J & Co. v.
General Hospital Leasing, Inc., 578 S.W. 2d 877, 878 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)(where court applying Texas law concluded that Article 2 did not apply since the computer hardware and
software were leased and not sold).
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desires to enter into a development contract which would fall within
Article 2, therefore, should draft the contract with language portraying
the transaction as sale of a computer program rather than as a contract
to obtain programming services.
2.

Tort Law

Under traditional tort law, the labelling by a court of an expert system as a product or service will determine whether the negligence or
strict liability in tort standard should apply. Under strict liability in
tort law (hereinafter "strict liability"), the policies underlining the
emergence of strict liability make a strong case for treating mass marketed expert systems as a product. Where a program is distributed on a
mass market basis, the analogy to any other product is clear. Most completed programs distributed to more than a single user possess sufficient
characteristics of a product to fall under strict liability principles. In
such cases, the individuals who are functioning within the foreseeable
risk zones rely on the expert system's safe structure and design, and the
manufacturer and designer can spread the risk of losses through pricing
and insurance. Furthermore, the victim's ability to trace defects to the
programming operation and to establish negligence in that remote enterprise is rendered difficult or impossible by the context. The expert
system is the embodiment of complex programming techniques which
require input of expert information into the knowledge base and the
structure of the knowledge base itself. It is only when the output of the
expert system is restricted to a single user that the programmer's undertaking lacks the affirmative commitment of a product to the market
30
place that establishes potential liability for defects.
Classification as an information generator rather than as a traditional form of goods does not affect the issue of whether the expert system is labelled as a product to which strict liability principles. A strict
liability analysis was applied to an "information product" in the Ninth
Circuit case, Aetna Casualty & Security v. Jeppeson & Co. 3 1 Jeppeson
involved instrument approach charts distributed for pilots making instrument approaches to various airports. A defect in a chart allegedly
caused the crash. The court concluded that the charts were products
for purposes of applying principles of strict liability. The analogy to
software products and expert systems is relatively clear, assuming a
clear connection between a risk of physical injury and a defective
product.
Nevertheless, the operation of some expert systems may demand
intervention by a human user during the deduction process. In many
30. R. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY, ch. 7, 25-26 (1985).

31. 642 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1981).
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applications, the user and expert system may join to create a diagnosis.
For example, in Jeppeson, the court held that the pilot was negligent in
his reliance on the defective charts.3 2 In such an area, where physical
injury is at risk, it is improbable that an expert system developer would
be held to a strict liability standard where the physical injury was
caused by the output of the expert system and the expert system required significant intervention and review by the professional using the
program.
Imagine an engineer who uses an expert system to design a bridge.
The knowledge base of the expert system contains all the necessary
mechanics for applying the physical laws to building the bridge. During
the process of its configuration and calculation, the expert system stops
and requests that the user-engineer review some of its deductions and
directs the user-engineer to approve before proceeding. At a different
point in the program, the expert system requires the user-engineer to
input important cost, weather, and environmental information. The expert system makes some final adjustments and produces a plan for the
bridge. The user-engineer implements the plan. Two weeks after the
bridge is built, it collapses. It is proven that the defective plans caused
the collapse. Under this scenario, it appears that the expert system described is not a product for strict liability purposes, because the actual
product, the design plans, is a product of the joint effort of the expert
system and the user-engineer. In this case, the expert system functioned as a service for the engineer and required important user intervention (i.e., cost, weather, and environmental information input and
verification of calculations). Even if it were widely distributed and mass
produced, the interaction with the professional user makes it appear
more like a service. On the other hand, it is conceivable that many expert systems may replace the professional entirely and require no coupling of effort to reach a diagnosis, decision, or plan.
Consider the following example, which is similar in effect to the
fact situation in Jeppeson.3 3 A commercial airline installs a computer
which uses an expert system to assist pilots in avoiding mid-air collisions. The program is valuable to the airline because it provides warnings and data sufficient to assist in making a "split-second" decision to
avoid other aircraft. The program does not pause its analysis to request
human intervention or require verification. The pilot/air traffic controller acts on the output or advice of the program, and a collision ensues. In this case, the expert system looks more like a product than the
previous example, because the expert system in this instance provides a
32. Id. at 343.
33. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
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product (information) which is expected to be relied upon without verification or human intervention.
Therefore, whether a mass produced and distributed expert system
is a product for strict liability purposes depends on the actual make-up
and orientation of the expert system to a particular area. A developer
which desires to avoid classification of its expert system as a product
should be advised to design and market the expert system that requires
some human intervention in reviewing the analysis of the expert
system.
An argument for classifying an expert system as a service is that it
can be individually tailored to perform a specific task. Viewing the interaction between the programmer and the user in the development of
a specific expert system as a service, strict liability would not be applicable to such a one-of-a-kind product.34
Strict liability might apply to expert systems (deemed to be "products") that cause certain types of injury involving ordinary programming errors, which are likely to be considered production defects, as
well as to those with design defects that cause injury, especially when
the defective expert system directly operates a machine that inflicts injury on an individual (a la RoboCop).35 If on the other hand, the injury
is related to a conscious design choice, the6 defendants are likely to be
judged according to a negligence standard.3
Expert systems that are mass produced which cause injuries without any required human interaction with the expert system would presumably be classified as a product for purposes of strict liability law.
Many expert systems will not take this form. Thus, courts will have the
difficult task of deciding whether an individual expert system is a product or a service.
The following elements of an expert system will make the distinction between a product and a service more difficult to make: (1) one-ofa-kind applications; (2) human intervention as part of the expert system's deductive process; (3) an application area where no reasonable
user would blindly rely on the output of the expert system; (4) experimental programs where the user is aware of the infancy of the testing
process; and (5) where the user has contracted a programmer to develop
a expert system and compensation is for the programmer's services
rather than the value of the expert system program.
34. See Comment, Computer Software and Strict Liability, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 439,

444 n.17 (1983) (arguing, on balance, for classification of computer programs as products
for strict liability purposes).
35. See Brannigan & Dayhoff, Liability for Personal Injuries Caused by Defective
Medical Computer Programs,7 AMERicAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MED. 123 (1981).
36. Id. at 131.
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RECOVERY UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

As already discussed, most contracts for expert system procurement will likely be held, or stipulated to by the parties, as contracts for
a product under the U.C.C.3 7 Generally, courts have had little difficulty
in concluding that software procured alone or in connection with computer hardware is subject to the provisions of Article 2.38
1. Statute of Limitations
The U.C.C. limits contract actions to four years after the cause of
action arises, and allows parties to decrease this time to as little as one
year. 39 Vendors usually insist upon a one-year limitations period for
most claims except for nonpayment 40 because of a perception that if a
dispute arises over a computer vendor's performance, the user probably
will not commence litigation until long after the original breach by the
vendor occurs.
In Int7 Business Mach. v. CatamoreEnterprises,Inc. [548 F.2d 1065 (1st
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 960 (1977)], which involved numerous

transactions between IBM and a jewelry company in Rhode Island, a
one-year limitations period contained in a written document was applied to an earlier oral agreement even though the court refrained
from deciding whether it had been superseded in its entirety by the
written agreement. Instead of suing IBM .... Catamore withheld payment. The limitations clause in question provided that '[n]o action, regardless of form, arising out of the services under this Agreement, may
be brought by either party more than one year after the cause of action
has accured [sic], except that an action for nonpayment may be brought
within one year of the date of last payment.' Since the alleged breach
by IBM occurred well prior to the date of last payment, IBM was able
to rely on this clause and sue Catamore for failure to
pay, while Cat41
amore was unable to counterclaim for IBM's breach.
The statute of limitations problem as applied to expert systems, becomes a barrier to many users where the vendor has incorporated into
the agreement that neither party can bring a cause of action more than
one year after the cause of action arises. The complexity of an expert
system and its relation to the occurring harm may be so obscure and uncertain at the time that the cause of action arises, that it may take the
user more than the one year allowed under the agreement to discover
37. See supra text accompanying notes 16-29.
38. See supra text accompanying notes 16-29.
39. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1978).
40. See, e.g., Int'l Business Mach. v. Catamore Enterprises, 548 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir.
1976), cert denied, 431 U.S. 960 (1977).
41. Bernacchi, Davidson, and Grogan, Computer System Procurement,30 EMORY L.J.
395, 404 (1981).
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that the vendor is, in fact, in breach of the terms of the contract. If
every time a possible breach occurs in connection with the agreement
for procurement of an expert system the user sues the vendor42 , it may
be difficult to state facts sufficient to support a cause of action.
2.

Integrationor Merger Clauses

During the stage of negotiations for the procurement of an expert
system, the user will typically be subjected to a wide range of representations as to the capabilities of the company's software and its performance capabilities on various computer hardware configurations. "Sales
personnel . . . may make oral representations regarding commitments

by the vendor to program the software correctly, maintain the equipment, respond to service calls with a fixed number of hours, replace defective software, and perform other services, all designed to convince
'43
the user that the overall package ...is the best that money can buy.
The user makes his choice based on the combination of the written
materials offered, the oral representations made, and deference to
others in the same trade.
Almost invariably, however, most computer contracts (usually vendor standard form contracts) have a clause providing that there are no
understandings or agreements exist between the parties except as specified in the written contract, and that the vendor has no obligations to
the user except as expressly set forth in the contract. So-called merger
or integration clauses are generally held to be valid. 4 Usually, the exclusion of evidence with regard to contract claims cannot be avoided
and the plaintiff must therefore pursue tort claims in order to introduce
the damaging evidence.
In Applications, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Cr..... such evidence was
held to be admissible to prove fraud claims. The court concluded with
regard to warranties, the written instrument was the complete and final embodiment of the parties' agreement and that no evidence of
other alleged oral warranties or representations could be introduced
of demonstrating that certain critical warranties had
for the purpose
45
been made.

Obviously, a user would be well-advised to consider the parol evidence rule during negotiations by insisting that all the understandings
42. The user may sue whenever anything goes wrong related to the expert system so
as to preserve a cause of action against other parties.
43. Bernacchi, Davidson, & Grogan, supra note 41, at 405.
44. Bernacchi, Davidson, & Grogan, supra note 41, at 405.
45. 501 F.Supp. 129, 133 (S.D.N.Y.). But cf Consol. Data Term. v. Applied Digital
Data Systems, 708 F.2d 385 (1983) (where the court held that specifications of computer
response time on which buyer relied were express warranties that could not be quashed
by a disclaimer in the contract provisions).
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of the parties be incorporated into the agreement. This practice may
prove extremely difficult when the potential user considers buying an
expert system from a vendor licensed to sell the program on behalf of a
manufacturer. Typically, the vendor must abide by the limited warranty
and disclaimer form supplied by the manufacturer. 46 In most cases of
the procurement of a mass produced expert system, it will be virtually
impossible to negotiate warranty terms. Only where both parties are
sophisticated and relatively equal in bargaining power, may the merger
or integration clause depict what the parties actually bargained.
The inability for many buyers to incorporate representations made
in reference to software, either contractually or by proving such representations, is a problem which may spawn legislation implying warranties in computer advertising. Such a bill has been introduced before the
California State Legislature. The bill, Assembly Bill 1507 (hereinafter
"AB 1507"), as amended by Assemblywoman Glorina Molina, 47 (D-Los
Angeles), would hold manufacturers and retailers liable for their advertising claims for a product.
AB 1507 provides that every sale or lease of new computer products
or parts is to be accompanied by an implied warranty of merchantability
if sold by a dealer, by an implied warranty of fitness where the manufacturer or seller has reason to know of the required purpose and that
the buyer is relying on the skill or judgment of the manufacturer seller,
and an express warranty that the product conforms to promises and affirmations in the manufacturer or seller's advertisements. AB 1507 pro46. Hardware and software warranty and liability disclaimers often resemble the following disclaimer drafted by the manufacturer of a popular computer system:
DISCLAIMER OF ALL WARRANTIES AND LIABILITY
Inc. and make no warranties, either express or implied, with respect to this manual or with respect to the software described in this manual, its
quality, performance, merchantability, or fitness for any particular purpose. computer software is sold or licensed "as is". The entire risk as to its quality and
performance is with the buyer. Should the program prove defective following
their purchase, the buyer (and not Computer, Inc., or -,
their distributors, or their retailers) assumes the entire cost of all necessary servicing, repair,
or correction and any incidental or consequential damages. In no event will Inc., or be liable for direct, indirect, incidental, or consequential damages resulting from any defect in the software, even if they have been advised of the
possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation
of implied warranties or liability for incidental or consequential damages, so the
above limitation exclusion may not apply to you.
Reference Manual for the Apple II Microcomputer, Apple Computer, Inc. (1981) reprinted in Cronin, Consumer Remedies for Defective Software, 28 WASH. U.J. OF URBAN
& CONTEMPORARY L. 273, 277 (1985).
47. Assemblywoman Molina got the idea for the bill after she purchased an Apple
Lisa computer to do mass-mailing projects for her office. After six months of trying to get
the computer to do what she had bought it for, Molina got Apple to replace a microchip
unit in her Lisa that, in effect, converted it to a less expensive Macintosh. L.A. Daily J.,
August 8, 1985, at 2, col. 1.
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hibits the disclaimer or limitation of duration of those warranties and
the recovery of attorney's fees if the buyer prevails in an action to enforce liability under AB 1507, as enacted. Finally, AB 1507 states that
the remedies provided to the buyer are intended to be cumulative in
that all procedures, rights, or remedies are still available under any
other provision of law.
To date, no such legislation exists. Thus, to help alleviate the effect
of the integration clause, a user should insist that any sales brochures
or sales documents, including any responses from the computer vendor
to the user's requestfor proposals, should be attached to, and expressly
made a part of, the agreement. With these documents attached to the
formal agreement, the user will ensure that the representations and
statements of the vendor's sales representatives which induced the user
to procure the computer systems will not be excluded from consideration in any interpretation of the agreement during a dispute. Vendor's
should be careful about their advertisements and conduct of sales representatives such that they describe carefully their product in the best
light possible without misleading a potential buyer. 48
3.

Disclaimer of Warranties

If the U.C.C. applies to expert system software, damages for breach
of express warranty include the difference in value between the defective and warranted software, 49 plus incidental and consequential damages.5° Express warranties usually appear with warranty disclaimers
and limitations on remedies.5 ' Generally, the U.C.C. permits these limitations.5 2 The U.C.C. provides two important implied warranties: the
implied warranty of merchantability53 and the implied warranty offitness for a particularpurpose.s 4
In order for the implied warranty of merchantability to apply,
there must be a "contract for [the] sale . . .[of] goods" and the seller
must be a merchant "with respect to goods of that kind. 55s The implied
warranty of merchantability imposes on the merchant of goods an obligation to provide goods which are merchantable, which requires the
goods to pass without objection in the trade, and to be fit for the ordi48. Bernacchi, Davidson, & Grogan, supra note 41, at 411-12.
49. U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (1978).
50. Id. at §§ 2-714(3), 2-715.
51. See Cronin, supra note 46, at 277 n.19. See also, Gemignani, ProductLiability and
Software, 8 RUTGERS J. COMPUTER TECH. & L. 173, 177 (1981).
52. U.C.C. §§ 2-719, 2-316 (1978).
53. Id. at § 2-314.
54. Id. at § 2-315.

55. Id. at § 2-314(1).
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nary purposes for which they are used.56 An implied warranty of
merchantability may be disclaimed either orally or in writing, if the
writing is conspicuous, and as long as the word merchantability is used
57
in the written or oral disclaimer.
In order for the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
to apply, the vendor must "at the time of contracting [have] reason to
know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that
the buyer is relying on the [vendor]'s skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods ....
,58 This situation will almost always be present
in most sales of expert systems. If MYCIN is purchased by a doctor, it
is obvious to all concerned that the doctor is going to use it for bacterial
59
analysis.
An unsophisticated user, with little or no knowledge of computers, is
approached by sales representatives of a computer company who evaluate the user's business and make recommendations for a system which
will meet those needs. A more sophisticated user may create a general
list of its requirements, may incorporate it into a 'request for proposals,' and may distribute this document to suitable computer vendors.
Each vendor responds by indicating how its particular system with appropriate modifications to its software will meet the user's needs. Relying on the expertise of the computer company, the user agrees to buy
the system, confident that the system will suit its needs. 6°
In this context it has been recognized that the warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose is quite appropriate. 61 For example, in Sperry
Rand Corp. v. Industrial Supply Corp., 6 2 "the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose was 'clearly' established when the vendor
sent the user a detailed set of written recommendations based upon the
'63
vendor's study of the user's needs.
The warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is also typically
"disclaimed by vendor form contracts which usually contain language
similar to the following: 'THERE ARE NO UNDERSTANDINGS,
AGREEMENTS, REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
OR
IMPLIED
(INCLUDING
ANY
REGARDING
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PUR56. Id. at § 2-314(2). Other requirements also need to be fulfilled, but the requirements mentioned in the text are more appropriately applied to computer related contracts
than are the others. See Bernacchi, Davidson, & Grogan, supra note 41, at 412.
57. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) at comment 3 (1978).

58. Id. at § 2-315.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
60. Bernacchi, Davidson, & Grogan, supra note 41, at 412-13.
61. Id. at 413. See e.g., National Cash Register Co. v. Adell Indus., Inc., 57 Mich.App.
413, 225 N.W. 2d 785 (1975).
62. 337 F.2d. 363 (5th Cir. 1964).
63. Bernacchi, Davidson, & Grogan, supra note 41, at 413.
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POSE) NOT SPECIFIED HEREIN, RESPECTING THIS CONTRACT
OR THE EQUIPMENT HEREUNDER.' 64 The U.C.C. provides that
an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose may be excluded
by general language if that language is in writing and is conspicuous.6
Even in the absence of an express exclusionary clause, implied warranties may be excluded in several other circumstances. If the user examined or had an opportunity to examine the expert system before
entering into the contract, the implied warranties do not apply to any
defect that an examination might have revealed.6
4. Limitation of Damages
Absent contractual modification, the U.C.C. provides that the buyer
in most cases may recover consequential damages arising from any
breach of contract. "Consequential damages" include "any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the
seller at the time of contracting had reason to know . . . and injury to
person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty. '67 In general, consequential damages encompass the effects resulting from the breach, such as lost profits or unrealized but
anticipated personnel savings. 68
The U.C.C. provides that "consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation... is
unconscionable." 69 Vendors typically incorporate into the agreement a
clause which places a ceiling on liability, usually by limiting the amount
paid by the user under the contract and by excluding liability for "indi70
rect, special or consequential damages."
5.

Unconscionability

The U.C.C. provides that a court may refuse to enforce any contract
or clause of a contract on a finding that the contract or clause was un64. Bernacchi, Davidson, & Grogan, supra note 41, at 414 (quoting Investors Premium
Corp. v. Burroughs Co., 389 F.Supp. 39, 45 (D.S.C. 1974)).
65. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) at comment 4 (1978).
66. Id. at § 2-316(3)(b). This "examination" should be clearly distinguished from "inspection" or "acceptance testing," which occurs after the contract has been entered into,
but before the expert system has been accepted as conforming to the contract. Id. at § 2316, Comment 8. In contrast, examination is intended to refer to the user's selection process before entering into an agreement. Id. An example relevant to expert systems sales
would be inspecting programs and watching demonstrations of a particular vendor's expert system prior to signing a purchase agreement.
67. Id. at § 2-715(2).
68. Teamsters Sec. Fund v. Sperry Rand Corp., 6 C.L.R.S. 951 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
69. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1978).
70. Teamsters Security Fund v. Sperry Rand Corp., 6 C.L.R.S. 951, 968 (N.D. Cal.
1977). Such clauses also include "incidental" and "exemplary" damages, "lost profits" and
"other pecuniary loss," or a mixture of these phrases.

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. VIII

conscionable at the time it was made. 71 The purpose of this doctrine is
to prevent "oppression and unfair surprise and not [to disturb an] allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power." 72 A clause or
contract normally is not refused enforcement unless both procedural
73
and substantive unconscionability are present.

In The Glovartorium,Inc., v. Nat? Cash Registar Corp.,74 the buyer
relied on a model and the seller's assurances which did not in fact reflect the true performance limitations of the business records system
computer program. The lower court indicated that the limitations language was unconscionable in the face of this clear reliance by an inexperienced buyer. The appellate court affirmed a substantial damage
award based on the lower court's finding of fraud, however, without expressly affirming the unconscionability claim.
"The argument is that even an otherwise sophisticated business
person can not reasonably appreciate the significance of warranty and
damage limitation language in this context. This argument has been
generally rejected . . . . 7 As one court noted, businessmen are presumed to act at arm's length and mere technological naivet6 is inadequate cause to disrupt this presumption on issues relating to assumption
of risk.76 Although a businessman may not be sophisticated in computers, the presumed sophistication in commercial matters coupled with
77
an ability to obtain legal and other assistance is ordinarily decisive.
The application of unconscionability to expert systems will probably center on the business sophistication of the user. Currently, most
expert system users are highly trained professionals. Nothing appears
special about this group to require a different application of the unconscionability standard.
D.

RECOVERY UNDER CURRENT TORT PRINCIPLES

"Injury caused by an expert system can be traced to programmers,
users, distributors or manufacturers."7 8 For example, an expert system
71. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978).
72. Id. § 2-302 at Comment 1.
73. Procedural unconscionability focuses on the use of pressure or deceptive tactics,
the presence of extreme bargaining inequality, and significant differences in the sophistication of the parties. Substantive unconscionability encompasses terms that are unreasonably favorable to one party. NIMMER, supra note 30, ch. 6 at 52. See also Leff,
Unconscionability and the Code - The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U.P.L. REV. 485, 487
(1967); WHITE & SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 4-7 (2d ed. 1980).
74. 684 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1983).
75. NIMMER, supra note 30, ch. 6, at 53.

76. Earman Oil Co., Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 1291, 1300 (5th Cir. 1980).
77. Badger Bearing Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 444 F. Supp. 919, 923 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
78. Nycum & Fong, supra note 10, at 20.
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that monitors air traffic control at a busy airport and provides advice to
the air traffic controllers can fail and cause injury due to any combination of four sources of error: (1) errors in the program, 79 ; errors in the
knowledge base;80 (3) unintended use or failure to use or undue reliance
by the air traffic controller;8 ' and (4) hardware failure. The more difficult issue arises in determining the standard of reasonableness to apply
to the air traffic controller on relying or not relying on the expert system. As expert systems are used more, one would be negligent not to
use an expert system in that position.
1.

Proofof Negligence

Since expert systems are developed by the combined efforts of programmers and experts in a particular field, it may be extremely difficult to actually determine who is responsible for a design defect. The
human expert may have made an error explaining to the programmer
how a particular situation should be handled. Or, the programmer
could have developed a poorly fitted control structure and failed to encode the human expert's direction properly into the knowledge base. In
the air traffic control example, if a plane crashed as a result of the pilot's reliance on the advice given by the expert system, the plaintiff
would be faced with an enormous task of proving that the expert system failed. In a negligence action, where the burden is on the plaintiff
to prove that the defendant breached his duty of care (unless the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could be used to shift the burden),8 2 it would
take a substantial team of professionals to look into the matter and de83
termine the proximate cause of the error.
If the air traffic controller could prove that he was acting reasonably by relying on the expert system because it would have been unsafe
not to do so and it was customary for all air traffic controllers to act in
the same way, the ultimate victims would be hard pressed for recovery.
The air traffic controller could put on terrific evidence showing that air
79. Errors in the program may be a logic error (i.e., incorrect encoding of a programming step) or a design error (i.e., inefficient or incorrect choice of a programming step).
80. Errors in the knowledge base could mean inappropriate data or an erroneous inference rule which escaped testing. Nycum & Fong, supra note 10, at 21.
81. "Undue trust is placed on machines by some people who are either unaware of a

machine's capabilities or who purposefully wish to deflect the opinions of others. While
such cases will undoubtedly arise, it is my belief that they will be infrequent, since people
will seek to comprehend and question the results of computing machines as they have
done for other human artifacts." Nycum & Fong, supra note 10, at 21, n.39 (citing M.
DERTOUZOUS, THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION, 5 (1983)).
82. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 143, 208-09 (4th ed. 1971).
83.

Dertouzous, however, reminds us that "[a] jumbo aircraft is equally complex, yet

we make sure that it is comprehensible and that we know whom to prosecute if it
crashes." DERTOUZOUS,supra note 81, at 15.
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safety is greatly enhanced by the advent of expert systems and that the
expert systems help air traffic controllers increase safety in ways not
previously possible.
2. Standard of Reasonable Care
Another problem facing the potential tort plaintff is proving that
the defendant (when identifiable) breached a duty of care owed to the
plaintiff. The general standard of care is usually stated as that of the
"reasonable man of ordinary prudence." 4 This standard is difficult to
establish, however, since the industry has so few standards by which to
measure performance. One possible approach is to hold programmers
and computer consultants to a standard of a professional, and thus require a higher standard of care. This would ease the plaintiff's burden
of proof for a showing of negligence. Such a claim has been labeled as
85
computer malpractice.
A computer malpractice claim was given short shrift in Chatlos Systems v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp.86 The trial court dismissed Chatlos'
computer malpractice claim in the first footnote of its opinion. The
court found that the technical complexity and relative importance to
the business community of selling and servicing computer systems was
insufficient justification to impose greater potential liability.8 7 The case
was decided on contractual grounds in favor of Chatlos. The court may
have confronted the issue directly had the tort been the only grounds of
recovery.
If a plaintiff were successful by proving that an expert system was
the cause of his injury, and managed to identify those responsible for
the cause, one of the accused individuals might be a professional (besides the programmer) to which malpractice, or an elevated standard of
care, would ordinarily apply. For example, if the expert system in question concerned architecture, and the plaintiff proved that the architect,
upon which the expertise of the program was based, would have been
guilty of malpractice had the information come directly from him,
84. See W.

PROSSER, supra note 82, § 32, at 150.
85. Note, Computer Malpractice:Are ComputerManufacturers,Service Bureaus, and
ProgrammersReally the Professionals They Claim to Be?, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1065

(1983).
86. 479 F.Supp. 738, 740-41 (D.N.J. 1979), modified 635 F.2d 1081 (3d. Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1112 (1982) (Plaintiff, Chatlos, was involved in the design and manufacture of cable pressurization equipment for the telecommunications industry. Defendant

NCR, designed, manufactured and sold computer systems, programs and services. Chatlos
signed a systems services agreement for the sale of a NCR computer system to be operational within six months. The system had problems from the time it was installed; attempts were made to correct the system until a certain time when relations between the

parties ceased.)
87. Id.
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should the architect be liable in tort? The fact that his knowledge is
encoded into a computer program clouds the analysis. If this expert system were sold and advertised as the replacement of the architect's services, the reliance issues under traditional malpractice causes of action
would be present.
3.

Strict Liability in Tort

If an expert system is deemed a product, defective and unreasonably dangerous, recovery under strict liability principles may be applied
even if reasonable care were used or if no amount of care could have
prevented the injury.8 8 The appellate courts have not yet dealt with the
issue of whether a strict liability claim can be applied to computer
software. Such a claim will present a difficult legal analysis further ag89
gravated by the technical complexities.
III.

EFFECT OF LAW ON EXPERT SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT

At present, plausible legal theories for recovery from an injury
caused by an expert system include (1) breach of warranty and breach
of representations, (2) breach of contract, (3) ordinary negligence,
(4) professional negligence (malpractice), and (5) strict liability in tort.
A.

BREACH OF WARRANTY, BREACH OF REPRESENTATIONS AND
BREACH OF CONTRACT

Breach of warranty, breach of representations and breach of contract causes of action do not pose any threat to expert system development. Both parties to the contract can employ basic contract principles
for protection. The manufacturer or distributor of an expert system can
utilize the numerous disclaimers available to minimize losses. The purchaser or licensee of an expert system can negotiate for important protection. No inherent characteristics to expert systems merit different
treatment under contract law. In most circumstances, parties to the
contract do not lack sophistication. In the case of "mass produced, mass
marketed" expert systems, sales of such expert systems will fall within
Article 2 of the U.C.C. and provide the unsophisticated user/purchaser
whatever protection each state desires to give to such entities under its
applicable commercial code.
B.

ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE

Difficulties exist in establishing an appropriate standard of reasona88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, at 347-348 (1965).

89. Cf. Walker, Strict Liabilityfor Software Programs,27 FOR THE DEFENSE 14, October 1985. See also supra text accompanying notes 21-25.
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bleness for expert system developers because of the infancy of expert
system programming techniques and procedures. A key determinant in
expert system development is what standard will be applied to developers. To date, courts have not recognized programmers in the same class
as other professionals operating under a higher level of care. 90 As expert systems become more important to society, the law may adopt a
new standard of care for computer programmers.
One problem with expert systems is determining who ought to be
consulted as to the standard of care. The determination of the standard
of care might depend on where the mishap arose (i.e., in the design of
the program, in the knowledge base, or in the interaction with the
user.) This affects the determination of which different groups should
be considered "knowledgeable" and capable of establishing a standard.
Thus, if the cause of injury is traced to a faulty knowledge base, then
the "reasonable" standard of care should be established by the ordinary
reasonable care of an average knowledge base engineer in the industry.
Negligence, as a cause of action, forces the parties to a human standard. This means that the developer is not forced to be a perfect insurer or a perfect programmer, nor is the user permitted to be naive,
unwarrantly trusting or willfully blind to the potential hazards foregoing the use of his own judgment. The human standard will ensure that
the parties act reasonably under the circumstances. Even if the user/
plaintiff has followed instructions and his actions were logical, and if an
injury is caused by the output or action of an expert system, the defendant can still escape liability under a negligence claim if he acted
reasonably.
The advent of a new technology such as expert systems brings great
societal gains while often imposing costs on certain individuals. Who
should bear such costs? Perhaps the user/plaintiff should bear some of
the costs to the extent it would bear the costs under similar services it
would have received from a human expert. The user/plaintiff should
expect that, in its present state, expert system technology is no more
than the attempted emulation of human experts. The court should
treat the situation as it would had the plaintiff relied on a human expert rendering the same service. As long as the expert system performs
as reasonable as its equivalent human experts, an injured plaintiff will
not recover under an ordinary negligence cause of action.
C.

NEGLIGENCE OF A PROFESSIONAL

A computer programmer is presently required to act only as an average reasonable person under similar circumstances. 91 The failure of
90. See supra text accompanying notes 82-87.

91. See W. PROSSER, supra note 82, at 143, 150.
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the courts to allow a computer malpractice claim 92 may give a programmer, possessing superior intellectual capacity, an escape route when he
really should be liable. If an expert system is marketed as the
equivalent of or better than the human experts in a particular field, the
programming should reflect the same - i.e., an expert system which
performs like or better than a human expert.
Should the courts continue not to impose a higher standard of care,
expert system developers will continue to have significant freedom to
experiment and innovate with expert systems without concern for liability based on a yet undefined standard of care. Imposition of a higher
standard of care would raise costs and limit entry to the market place.
Holding a developer to a higher standard of care could result in more
required education, computer malpractice insurance, and possible industry attempts to define programming standards. Such standards would
certainly spawn more litigation because it would be easier to recover
against developers held to a higher standard of care.
D.

STRICT LIABILrrY IN TORT

At present, no software programs causing injury have been held to
a no-fault standard. Many commentators believe, however, that courts
will have no difficulty in imposing strict liability on computer programs
causing physical injury as long as the requisite components of a strict
liability claim are present. 93 From an expert system development perspective, imposing a strict liability standard may hamper society from
benefiting from the developments of this important new technology.
Strict liability claims will first raise a primary definitional question,
i.e., whether certain expert systems are products or services.94 As a result of the ambiguity of whether their expert system will be deemed a
product or a service, many developers may alter the design, cost or features of their systems specifically in fear of being held liable based on a
strict liability claim. The very nature of expert systems will raise inevitable situations where injury will occur as a result of the expert systems' functions. A large class of "real world" problems are not
susceptible to predictable, verifiable results. Expert systems try to emulate human reasoning; thus, an attempt to hold developers to a no-fault
standard would require programmers to create a perfect electronic intelligence capable of out-performing a host of human experts.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 82-87.
93. See Gemingnani, supra note 51, at 197; Comment, supra note 34, at 456; Brannigan
& Dayhoff, supra note 35.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 12-16.
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PROPOSED LEGAL AND PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS
A.

STRICT LmILrrY

The courts should not impose a strict liability standard on expert
systems. Further, society must share the costs of developing this important new area of programming. Expert systems inherently are composed of fallible human reasoning which leads to non-verifiable results.
Each user should carefully test a new expert system and rely upon its
output only within the scope of verifiable results produced during the
user's own testing process. If the manufacturer fails to inform the user
of its expert systems' potential flaws, the user would be able to employ
tort claims other than strict liability for recovery. Developers of expert
systems should, however, be held to higher level of care when the expert system is advertised as a superior programming project.
B.

LIABLITY OF PROFESSIONALS

Should the computer industry or government create a more defined
and ascertainable class of expert system programmers, a computer malpractice claim should be available to potential plaintiffs. Such a claim
would allow a user/plaintiff to bring a professional malpractice claim
against the programmer/defendant. The plaintiff would have to prove
that the defendant breached a graduated degree of care in the creation
and implementation of the expert system above that of an average reasonable person of ordinary prudence.
The defendant could rebut by (i) demonstrating that the design and
implementation of the expert system is consistent with the proven state
of the art technology, and (ii) showing that he is qualified to participate
in the development of an expert system by experience and/or education. The degree of care will be established similarly to that of lawyers
and doctors in legal and medical malpractice suits, respectively.
C.

HIGHER STANDARD OF CARE IN A NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION

Courts or legislatures should impose a higher standard of care on
expert system developers to elevate the standards of education and experience of the developers only if the industry is unable to regulate itself to an acceptable level of social responsibility.
The industry should require that expert system developers receive
credentials showing that developers are competent to enter into important projects. With society becoming more dependent on computer related technology, society must require that the computer industry meets
society's needs in a socially responsible manner.
If the computer industry fails to regulate itself, a government entity could impose licensing requirements for certain types of program-
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ming including expert systems. Such licensing may include requisite
education, mandatory internships, and both written and practical
examinations.
V. CONCLUSION
Expert systems are an exciting innovation holding excellent potential for important societal benefits. The nature of expert systems, however, clouds legal analysis in many hypothetical circumstances because
of the human reasoning comparison element.
The law will classify an expert system as a product or a service on a
case by case analysis. Expert system developers will be confronted with
the possibility of strict liability claims. Therefore, developers will initially modify or refrain from mass marketing expert systems for which
their classification as a product or a service for purposes of tort and contract law application is unclear.
Imposition of a higher level of care on expert system programmers
could be beneficial to society if the elevated legal standard of care
causes the programming industry to regulate itself and insure users that
the programming of an expert system meets a strict code of calibre.
Tod M. Turley

